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Introduction
Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds
martin thomas

Mental Maps, Disorder, and Colonial Violence
It was political scientist Alan Henrikson who introduced us to the term
“mental maps” as a determinant of social action.1 The idea that the attitudinal outlooks embedded in minds as a result of cultural formation
and past experience are integral to political choices has gained purchase
ever since. Among the specialist communities quickest to recognize the
usefulness of the “mental maps” idea have been Henrikson’s fellow
political scientists, international historians, and scholars of the “missing dimension” of intelligence service activity interested in processes of
cognition — the way the world is understood — and resultant analytical thinking.2 Historians of empire and colonialism have, by contrast,
tended to use the idea of mental maps piecemeal, sometimes to explain
the diffusion of Orientalist thinking, sometimes to account for (usually
misguided) policy decisions, but more often in a rather nebulous way to
illustrate the misapprehensions of European publics about the colonial
empires held in their name.
The ﬁrst volume of this collection on French “colonial minds” suggested that one issue uniting the various people and events described is
that thought normally precedes action. But the actions of those in positions of colonial power in the French Empire were also, to a greater to
lesser extent, reﬂective of established patterns of behavior. Furthermore,
as the phrase implies, a pattern of behavior necessarily took shape over
xi
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time through repetition and reinforcement of certain actions.3 In the case
of army or police organizations, such repetition and reinforcement could
entrench certain patterns of behavior, sometimes disbarring consideration of alternative perspectives that cut against the grain of prevailing
military assumptions about subject populations and how they were to
be regarded, policed, or otherwise “controlled.” The organizational cultures of France’s colonial security forces, in other words, often acted as a
barrier to reﬂective engagement with colonial peoples. As a result rarely
were innovations, whether in operational practice or in military cultures,
internally generated outside crisis conditions. Only after dramatic political failures or violent outbreaks were attitudes likely to change, which is
part of what Edgar Schein, a leading theorist of organizational culture,
terms the process of “trauma learning.”4 But were colonial military
minds susceptible to such learning in less overtly violent times?
Here we come to perhaps the most challenging and often the most
revealing aspect of colonial minds at work: those situations in which, it
seems, thought hardly preceded action at all. Indeed, in some instances
historians posit that the behavior of Europeans in unfamiliar colonial
settings was anything but rational. Numerous colonial encounters, from
initial contact to protracted exposure, have been described in terms of
irrationality, mental disorder, even madness, or, less dramatically, as
the abandonment of European norms and manners, the dread outcome
of which was “going native.”5 A distinct subdiscipline of “colonial”
psychiatry, many of whose practitioners and critics achieved lasting notoriety, looked on the racial differentiation inherent to colonial societies
as pivotal to new delineations of mental disorder and supposed African
inferiority that helped entrench colonial power.6
The metaphor of psychiatric disorder will also be familiar to anyone
acquainted with the work of Martiniquan psychiatrist and anticolonial
revolutionary Frantz Fanon, as well as to scholars of decolonization
more generally. As Ann Laura Stoler has recently reminded us, Fanon’s
central concern with the lasting physical distress, the personal degradations, and psychological disorders left among Algerians scarred by
French colonial rule was very much a study in the ruination of minds.7
And as Benjamin Brower and Marnia Lazreg have emphasized in the
same context, any study of colonial “ofﬁcial thinking,” whether in the
xii
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ﬁrst phases of imperial conquest or in the ﬁnal years of colonial collapse,
must engage with the cruelties and coercion perpetrated as part of the
imperial claim to govern groups and communities judged subordinate
and inferior.8
If Fanon’s primary purpose was to explain the injustices of colonialism in terms of their corruptive effects on the minds of colonizers and
colonized alike, his preoccupation with violence — whether that perpetrated in the name of the colonial state or that demanded of colonial
subjects freeing their bodies and purifying their minds through acts of
insurrection — suggests that the study of colonialism must encompass the
study of violence. Such investigation must attempt at least two things.
First, we need to deﬁne what is meant by violence. The chapters to follow are dominated by physical acts of violence, most collective, some
individual. But the authors recognize that violence could also be otherwise. It might be cultural — the denigration of established ways of life or
particular ethnicities or religions, for instance. It could be social — and
here one thinks of the destruction of customary practices, communal
bonds, and economic relationships. And it was sometimes psychological — creating insecurity as a form of coercive practice. Violence, then,
covers a wide spectrum from physical injury to societal disruption and
the inculcation of fear.
Just as there were multifarious forms of violence, so, to paraphrase
Benjamin Brower, colonial violence was informed by a “multiple logic.”
Violent acts imposed new forms of social exclusion. Destruction or
seizure of resources created new economic hierarchies. Both provided
physical evidence of imperial “reach” far beyond established centers of
colonial power. The use of force, on some occasions, reﬂected presumptions about the impossibility or pointlessness of political compromise.
It mirrored ofﬁcial understanding about how colonized communities
understood displays of power. And it revealed deeply racist precepts
about the nature of permissible killing in “uncivilized” societies.9 Perhaps more familiar in the conquest period, these tendencies resurfaced
during France’s wars of decolonization during which anticolonial insurgents and their civilian backers were denied the rights accorded to
enemy combatants.10 State repression, at its most extreme during the
Algerian War, brings us to another unsettling problem: the muting effects
xiii
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of violence on colonial minds — and voices. Colonial civil and military
administrators imposed certain silences in respect of violent acts practiced for “reasons of state.”11 Their tendency to censor and censure was
compounded by the efforts of their anticolonial opponents to expose
the levels of violence practiced against them before the court of international opinion.12
Confronting the speciﬁcity of colonial coercion raises a second challenge: the need for a typology of violence to tease out its speciﬁcally
“colonial” dimension. If this explains Fanon’s near obsessive concern
with the subject, it also indicates why most studies of colonial violence tend to concentrate primarily on the perpetrators of violence and
their particular relationship with identiﬁable centers of colonial power,
whether these were governments, regional administrations, police and
army commands, or major corporate employers.13 Putting French violence ﬁrst takes us some way to identifying the colonial element in the
subject, but it does not alone sufﬁce. For the violent actions described
above could be seen as simple variants of state violence practiced within
acutely unequal societies and predicated on the control or conversion of
a dominant social group. This does not mean, however, that we should
reject the colonial state as a primary agent of colonial violence; far from
it. Perhaps more than anything else, what makes the violence described
in this volume different — and singularly colonial — is its duality. For
colonial violence was both constitutive of colonial power and destructive of it. And these opposing processes often proceeded simultaneously.
The contradiction here may be unraveled if we think in terms of conﬂicting short-term needs and longer-term goals. Violence as repression
was typically applied to impose colonial order in the short term. But
its prevalence undermined longer-term efforts to reconstruct colonized
societies to suit the requirements of the colonizing power. Violence could
silence opposition, but it was an insecure foundation on which to build
a supposedly better society. The ways in which French colonial minds
wrestled with this contradiction take us to the very essence of French
imperialism.
Sometimes routine state violence or military repression provoked acts
of spectacular counterviolence, which left entire army units wiped out.
Catastrophic losses like the October 1950 “Cao Bang disaster” during
xiv
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the Indochina War, which left 4,800 troops either dead or missing, or
the Palestro “massacre” southeast of Algiers in May 1956 in which
19 recently arrived rappelés and their section commander were fatally
ambushed sent shock waves through metropolitan opinion. These transgressions of the usual asymmetry between state repression versus anticolonial violence seared themselves into ofﬁcial memories of colonialism.14
Confronted with such dilemmas, perhaps not surprisingly the rulers
of empire increasingly conceptualized its stresses in literal terms. Once
social and political disorder in colonial territory was addressed in terms
of a psychological crisis afﬂicting those who ran the show, could the end
of colonial dominion be very far off? This was precisely what happened
in France’s postwar colonial service when senior ofﬁcials sought to diagnose and cure the alleged “malaise” among administrators trying to
govern an empire they no longer entirely controlled or understood. On
the other side of the colonial-anticolonial divide, Herman Lebovics has
stressed how frequently the rulers of empire made use of psychological
terms and diagnoses, albeit erroneously, to pathologize colonial rebellion and anticolonial activity more generally as evidence of antisocial
behavior rather than as a logical reaction to years of discrimination.15
As the chapters in this volume indicate, it is in the realm of colonial
violence that the apparent disjuncture between rationality and actions,
between sanity and psychiatric disturbance, between order and disorder, is most striking. If, as Caroline Ford has argued, the boundaries
between religious violence and organized political protest in France
became more porous during the nineteenth century, so, too, with the
horrendous exception of repression of the Paris Commune in 1870,
instances of collective violence in French society were less Rabelaisian,
less highly ritualized, less self-consciously hellish than they had been
in early modern France, most notably during the protracted religious
warring of the sixteenth century. Violence had not gone away, but the
codes of violent public behavior had changed.16 By the interwar period,
political violence in metropolitan France, still recurrent and endemic,
was nonetheless rationalized as either ideologically driven or part of the
lingering, traumatic aftermath of the Great War.17 Colonial violence was
represented differently in France at the time, not as politically organized
and functional and bound by certain accepted limits, but as culturally
xv
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derived, dysfunctional, and potentially unlimited. What went generally
unacknowledged was that such violence was often the result of colonial
intervention or perpetrated by the French themselves.
The forms and scale of colonial violence, as well as the range of
violent circumstances investigated here, conﬁrm that French men and
women both confronted and perpetrated violence in numerous ways.
Some were products of rebellion, others the by-product of war. But what
of less sensational occasions where the actions of Europeans appear,
superﬁcially at least, to have been unthinkingly violent? Was the casual
violence meted out to a domestic servant, a plantation worker, or an
intrusive street hawker carefully thought through, or was it merely a
conditioned, almost reﬂex, response? Michael Vann’s chapter in this second volume of the collection suggests, for instance, that French violence
in colonial Hanoi was as casual as it was habitual. Were the stereotypical
characterizations of indigenous traits the result of personal evaluation or
merely the repetition of attitudes prevalent in the colonial milieu of the
ofﬁcers’ club, the settler’s home, or even the governor’s residence? How
far was colonial stereotyping derivative of the prevalent French biomedical thinking and masculine honor codes to which Robert Nye’s work has
alerted us? If, as seems likely, a readiness to use violence was essential to
the socialization of young European men serving or working in colonial
territories, then perhaps we may be able to discern distinctly colonialist attitudes to violence itself.18 Bringing these viewpoints together, it is
tempting to suggest that colonial violence reﬂected the predominantly
masculine — and often highly macho — worlds of white colonial society,
and that violence was also integral to the fabric of productive relations
in colonial economies marked by labor-intensive industries, coercive
practices, and, at least until 1936, ofﬁcial resistance to legal recognition
of workers’ rights.19
Sociologies of Violence
Consideration of the parameters of colonial violence is made easier by
engaging with the ideas of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Originally
brought to prominence by his ethnographical research into Algeria’s
Kabyle Berber and Arab communities in the latter stages of the Algerian
War, Bourdieu had much to say about forms of violence.20 To appreciate
xvi
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this, one needs to dwell a little on his ideas of “capital” and “symbolic
violence.” Rejecting Marxist materialism and structuralism, Bourdieu
conceptualized capital as the various currencies of power in any given
social arena or ﬁeld. Individuals and groups seek to accumulate such
capital to enhance their social status and power. This capital could be
material and economic — tangible assets and resources — but it could also
be intangible: the cultural capital conferred by linguistic ability, specialist knowledge, and academic qualiﬁcation; or the “symbolic capital”
conferred by high ofﬁce, career achievement, or public reputation. This
search for prestige, for elevated social status, while not uniquely colonial,
was clearly manifest among ofﬁcials, traders, settlers, and missionaries
whose capacity to dominate or inﬂuence others rested, in part, on their
acquisition of such symbolic capital.21
Bourdieu’s theories are doubly relevant to us here because of his suggestion that possession of such capital also enhanced the ability of social actors to undertake acts of “symbolic violence,” that is, to impose
their own normative standards and social meanings on other sections
of society. In other words, armed with their advantages in capital — be it
material, cultural, or symbolic — dominant social actors could legitimate
their own prevailing standards and expectations about individuals’ behavior and deference to colonial authority as the normal way of things,
as the way the world should be. Herein lay the ultimate irony: for the
very success of symbolic violence such as this derived from the fact that
those inculcated to accept these normative standards as superior and
unchallengeable rarely perceived such domination as an act of violence
in itself.22
In this sense the art of successful domination is subterfuge. To take
a couple of examples, each from colonial Vietnam: evolving statist
conceptions of socioeconomic development, or mise en valeur in the
Vietnamese territories, justiﬁed French control in terms of heightened
productivity, increased national output, and, in consequence, the amelioration of poverty.23 Yet the prevailing modes of colonial production,
from plantation agriculture to rubber extraction and mining, remained
labor intensive, highly exploitative, and always poorly paid. The entire
modernization project had labor coercion and continued impoverishment at its core.24 At the same time, French imposition of educational
xvii
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curricula that systematically denigrated precolonial cultures while lauding France’s historic achievements illustrated Bourdieu’s conception of
symbolic violence in practice.25 If we can see forms of violence in the
printed word of the schoolroom, then surely it was also present in the
adult world of colonial workplaces and private lives. Put simply, how
should we read such quotidian facets of colonial rule: the low-level but
persistent colonial violence, the petty prejudice, or the ingrained racism
of some colonial minds? Were they born of the colonial encounter, or
were they products of attitudes and assumptions developed over time,
sometimes in France itself? Was colonial violence part of European efforts to sustain order, or did it reﬂect the breakdown of order whether
at the national, local, or even familial level?
Again, other sociological approaches may help us here. Expanding on
the work of Donald Black and Roberta Senechal de la Roche, the social
theorist David Sciulli draws a conceptual distinction between consensual
and nonconsensual types of “orderly behavior.” He suggests on the one
hand that orderliness may reﬂect individuals’ capacity for social control,
but on the other hand that orderly behavior may also be the outcome
of social integration. As Sciulli explains it, “Individuals are controlled
when it is not possible for them simply to recognize and understand
in common what is expected of them; in their fear and anxiety, they
are supine. By contrast, individuals’ orderliness may be a product of
their possible social integration when the rules or duties orienting their
behavior are at least kept recognizable and understandable.”26 Sciulli’s
ideas are useful when considering violent interactions between colonial
overseers and colonized subjects because they suggest that external imposition of “orderly behavior” amounted to a form of social engineering
built on the premise that the colonial subjects to be made “orderly” were
incapable of integration into a colonial order that was alien to them.
Colonial subjugation, in other words, stemmed from the institutionalization of repressive social control within the bureaucratic and legal fabric
of the colonial state. Whether or not colonial control stemmed directly
from military conquest, it seems reasonable to suggest that violence was
integral to the structures of colonialism: its economic foundations, its
institutions, and its governing precepts.27
The full implications of this argument bear ampliﬁcation. Just as the
xviii
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organized use of violence might be constitutive of order, in this case the
consolidation of the administrative apparatus of the colonial state, its
demands and its practices, so resistance to it might be destructive of
that order.28 To borrow sociological terminology, collective violence,
or the coordinated inﬂicting of physical damage by a group, is not abnormal or “deviant”; rather it is a form of social control capable of
coherent explanation. As the leading social theorist Charles Tilly has
warned us, while it is rash to claim that such violence conforms to any
generic laws or theories, discrete patterns of collective violence may
be discerned nonetheless.29 We have, it seems, come a long way from
Gustave Le Bon’s elaboration of “crowd theory” in the 1890s. Far from
being symptomatic of mass hysteria or the derangement of a collective
“crowd mind” as Le Bon suggested, group violence may be justiﬁed,
either as a form of social protest in the absence of permitted nonviolent
alternatives, or, on the opposing side of the political divide, as a means
to suppress such protest.30 Its form and frequency is also conditioned
by the “conﬂict structure” that pertains in the society in question; in
other words it is substantially contingent on the extent of social division,
economic iniquity, and perceived cultural difference between the parties
involved.31 To use the language of political psychology, levels of political
violence are likely to reﬂect patterns of socialization in a particular community as well as the form and extent of centralized state control over
that community.32 To paraphrase Jeff Goodwin’s work on revolutionary
movements after 1945, violent protest is typically pursued by groups
that discern “no other way out” of their societal condition.33 If we take
these indicators as our yardstick, endemic violence in colonial societies
is unsurprising both because the socialization of dependent peoples as
colonial subjects denied them basic rights and resources, and because,
paradoxically, colonial state control was typically too weak or remote
to enforce rigid popular compliance in all circumstances. Furthermore,
the sense of embattlement among colonial elites nurtured threat perceptions about the local populations around them that became manifest
in heightened levels of repression whenever the colonial state seemed
especially vulnerable to dissent or overthrow.34
Yet, as Roberta Senechal de la Roche has argued convincingly — if
provocatively — a double standard lurks in much of the sociological litxix
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erature on collective violence in sharply unequal societies. While the
violence perpetrated by those suffering discrimination or oppression
has been rationalized and in many cases defended or excused, that of
the dominant groups in such societies is usually depicted as not only
indefensible but irrational too.35 Adapted to our analytical context, the
violence of the colonial oppressed is commonly depicted by academics
as a normative response — maybe even a laudable one, but the counterviolence it triggered from state authorities is typically seen as both unjust
and abnormal. Looking back from a post-empire perspective, we are
therefore confronted with an exact inversion of the way in which colonial minds viewed the violence of colonizers and colonized. If Senechal
de la Roche is right, then surely it is incumbent on us to exercise particular care when interpreting the violent actions of the rulers of empire
and the outlooks and normative standards that lay behind them.

Rationalizing Colonial Violence
Such actions signiﬁed a reﬂection and a reinforcement of behaviors commonly observed in intercommunal colonial relations. This is not to reduce
the Frenchmen and Frenchwomen of empire to mere “colonizer” stereotype. Not all resorted to violence. Not all denigrated indigenous society
or, to use their own parlance, the indigènes they employed, they knew, or,
in many cases, they lived alongside. Take, for instance, Albert Memmi,
the Tunis-born novelist and teacher who ﬁrst articulated the supposedly
binary opposition between rulers and ruled in his 1957 book, The Colonizer and the Colonized, and who conceded that those on each side of
his equation were trapped there by circumstance, not choice.36 Memmi
drew on his childhood experiences as a Jew in a predominantly Muslim
colonial city and was writing just as Tunisia neared independence from
France. He found himself trapped between the opposing categories he described. He recognized, nonetheless, that colonizers sustained their privileged position by accepting and sometimes working for a fundamentally
racist political system, and a system upheld by coercing and excluding
those that it identiﬁed as inferior. Colonialism, in other words, was inherently violent, and its wrongs could only be rectiﬁed by destroying it.37
Memmi’s insight was to accept that there could be no halfway house
on the road to decolonization. Yet others before him genuinely believed
xx
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in the progressive potential of colonialism and aspired to contribute to
it. Individuals such as these sought to cultivate dependent populations
rather than to expropriate from them, albeit on their own terms.38 Indeed, some of the bitterest critics of colonial coercion and racial abuses
emerged from settler communities or colonial careers. But one thing
remains inescapable. The European populations spread across the French
empire inhabited societies in which the differential treatment and the
differential characterization of people were fundamental to the functioning of the colony. And, whatever its roots in colonial conquest, in
the political forms of the colonial state, in the economic structures of
empire, such differentiation was deeply embedded in colonial minds.
This was not a uniquely French phenomenon. Nor was it reducible to
a single, generic racism derived from particular racial theories.39 Nor
were discriminatory actions explicable simply as the product of a longstanding foreign occupation. Yet, for all that, differential treatment of
people according to their ethnicity, gender, or sexuality, whether actual
or presumed, was prevalent among settlers, ofﬁcials, and missionaries;
in short, among Europeans in the colonies.
Institutionalized discrimination and the high incidence of low-level,
banal violence across racial and communal divides cannot be reduced
to a simplistic binary characterization of hegemonic colonial violence
versus determined anticolonial popular resistance. For one thing, the
colonial “presence” in many of the dependent territories colored blue,
pink, or orange on the European classroom walls of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was far less entrenched and altogether
more ﬂeeting than imperialist publics “back home” were led to believe.
In many places the “colonial state” hardly amounted to any kind of
functioning administrative provision at all.40 For another, European colonial bureaucrats such as those vying for inﬂuence across late nineteenthcentury tropical Africa typically justiﬁed the violence of conquest not as
enforced subjugation but as transient paciﬁcation, as the displacement
of the apparently endemic feuding between what veteran anthropologist
Jack Goody describes as “acephalous ‘tribal’ groups” by the orderliness of ﬁxed state boundaries, new legal regimens, and white-ofﬁcered
constabularies.41 Perhaps most important of all, an accretion of rules,
regulations, and customary practices made the use of violence routine.
xxi
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What one historian has recently termed “the banality of brutality” was
a sedimentary process in which arbitrary arrest, collective punishments,
coercive interrogation techniques, and denial of basic rights of redress
were all layers on which endemic security force violence was built. To
those acculturated to practice it, such violence was not exceptional or
inexcusable, but the logical outcome of past precedent — the way “to
get things done.”42
Even the use of corporal punishment, whipping and caning in particular, to coerce African labor or mete out instant discipline to alleged
wrongdoers was frequently excused by Europeans in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries as not only expedient but readily understood by those who experienced or witnessed it. According to the defenders of such practices, inﬂicting physical pain helped bring order both
to colonial society and to naive, disorderly African minds. It was no
coincidence that whereas ﬂogging was banned in the British Army during the 1870s, whipping and caning persisted within Britain’s colonial
forces in Africa until 1946.43 The institutionalization of colonial violence
through legal procedure and regimens of punishment was thus depicted
as progressive and modern, part of the transition from precolonial disorder to colonial order. Progressive it may have been claimed to be, but
colonial violence was also clearly systemic. It was in part bound up with
the political obligations, social structures, and economic processes imposed by European rule, in part facilitated by European understandings
of how order in dependent societies could and should be maintained.44
Moreover, as international efforts to codify binding laws of war gathered
momentum during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
imperial nations ensured that colonial rule was exempted from putative restrictions on the rights and actions of occupying powers.45 Not
until the composition of the United Nations General Assembly was
transformed by an inﬂux of formerly colonized Afro-Asian states in
the 1950s were levels of colonial violence ﬁnally exposed to sustained
and hostile international scrutiny.46 Prior to this, as we shall see, just as
violence was writ large in colonial experience, so it was integral to the
attitudes and cultures of practice of numerous colonial authority ﬁgures.
A number of the chapters in this volume also show that the colonies
were laboratories for organized violence, where new forms of suppresxxii
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sion, punishment, and political control were practiced and reﬁned. Colonial borrowing of metropolitan policing methods and the interplay
between colonial and metropolitan ideas of urban planning and social regulation in cities indicate that experimentation in forms of social
control was an interactive process between the empire and mainland
France.47 Innovation in organized colonial violence, whether in terms
of legal restrictions and punishments, policing dissent, or reconﬁguring
colonial cities to facilitate segregation and surveillance, was necessarily
a continuous process, but it reached a new intensity in the years immediately after World War I. There were several reasons for this. One was
population movement. While the French never colonized their empire
with Anglo-Saxon enthusiasm, economic pressure, the greater accessibility of colonial territory, and the expansion of colonial bureaucracy and
commerce in the interwar years sent tens of thousands of new colonists
to the empire. The new arrivals soon registered their presence in material change such as the growth of settler-inhabited nouvelles villes in
the cities of French North Africa and Vietnam, which gave concrete
expression to the economic and cultural hierarchies of colonialism.48
Also apparent after 1918 was a growing tension among politicians,
legislators, and ofﬁcials over the long-term direction of colonial policy
in the aftermath of a conﬂict so shockingly destructive that it rendered
formulaic rhetoric about the civilizing potential of European cultures
outmoded and trite. Genuine antipathy to empire remained a minority
interest, the preoccupation of Communist activists, colonial students
resident in France, and surrealist artists determined to demythologize
received wisdom about French imperial benevolence.49 Yet in the political mainstream too, French colonial minds were adjusting to different
currents of opinion about the long-term justiﬁcations for empire. Numerous government members, senior ofﬁcials, academics, writers, and
other social commentators, none of them anticolonialists, recognized
that France’s imperial purpose required some measure of reinvention,
perhaps even more radical revaluation. This rethinking underpinned
major colonial policy shifts informed by reconﬁgurations of race, ideas
of colonial citizenship, and the essence of French identity.50
For others, empire remained an unimpeachable project, but one
whose ﬁxity could only be sustained with the new technologies of
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coercive power more readily available after the Great War. It was no
coincidence that imperial conﬂicts of the 1920s became at once the
preferred sites of experimentation for new weapons of war — military
aircraft, armored vehicles, poison gas — and the dumping ground for
surplus military hardware left over from the years 1914–18. Colonial
rebels, dissentient colonial communities, and even recalcitrant colonial
taxpayers faced lethal violence delivered on an unprecedented scale by
airplanes, tanks, and machine guns.51 This trend toward greater lethality
in repressive violence was preﬁgured before 1914 in more widespread
use by colonial security forces of weaponry considered unacceptable
in intra-European conﬂict. The dumdum bullet, designed to maximize
bodily trauma and blood loss, stands as a ghastly exemplar of this shift.52
Using high-technology weapons (by the standards of the day) to assure
even greater asymmetry in colonial violence (keeping white casualties
down while killing as many opponents as possible) became still more
prevalent as European militaries built on their experiences of the Great
War. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the widespread turn to
“air policing” as a cheap but deadly form of colonial control. In the
expanded French and British colonial empires that took shape after
World War I newly available apparatus of imperial coercion made the
open skies — the very air — over the North African Maghreb and the
Fertile Crescent of the Middle East a new type of political, military, and
cultural space. Politically, mastery of the air emphasized the apparent
superiority of Western industrial modernism, underscoring the right to
rule of imperial nations. Militarily, the airplane offered new possibilities
of force projection, destructive power, and consequent strategic advantage. Politically, coercive bombardment transcended the temporal divide
between initial imposition of colonial authority through the threat, or
use, of indiscriminate violence and the subsequent maintenance of imperial power through more selective violence targeted against dissident
populations, whether as an end in itself or as an instrument of broader
deterrence.53
Other key post–World War I changes help us understand what made
such repressive violence appear natural and unavoidable to its European
practitioners. To adapt Zara Steiner’s comment about the peacemaking
of 1919, none of the usual bases for state identity — language, religion,
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ethnicity, geography, ideology — commanded universal assent as a basis
either for individual colonial statehood or for common identity across
the French Empire as a whole.54 Concepts of what it was to be truly,
authentically French, whether citizen or worker, and not some ersatz,
colonial alternative were also fast becoming more ethnically and culturally exclusive.55 The year 1919 marked a moment of huge signiﬁcance
in the crystallization of racist attitudes in France for another reason:
the mass expulsion of factory workers, as well as other unskilled and
semiskilled laborers, recruited from the colonies to assist the war effort
in metropolitan France.56 As Tyler Stovall notes, “The vaunted exoticism and fascination with empire of the interwar years arose not just
from the colonial presence in wartime France, but also from its abrupt
termination once the war was over. . . . In sending imperial subjects
back home, the French inadvertently gave racial distinctions a new, and
permanent, place in the metropole itself.” In Stovall’s pithy summary,
“the very nature of Frenchness was conditioned by race.” The inescapable conclusion is that one of the most critical factors in making early
twentieth-century minds “colonial” was a sense of “whiteness” that
became synonymous with a more exclusive, ethnocentric idea of French
national identity in the 1920s and beyond.57
It is also worth remembering, however, that French colonial minds did
not solely deﬁne the limits of social inclusion and exclusion in terms of
whiteness. Ofﬁcials and settlers were often suspicious of colonial fellow
travelers, individuals who may have been employed by the colonial state
or French commercial enterprises, but who remained either ideologically
hostile to, or profoundly disillusioned with, the imperial project. The
colonies, after all, were sometimes a refuge for the escapee, the outsider,
or the felon, let alone the adventurer or the dissident. From 1895 onward in French West Africa, for example, police surveillance of white
Europeans was sometimes as rigorous as that of African colonial subjects. Indeed, transgression of acceptable norms of European behavior,
whether culturally or politically, carried with it the threat of expulsion,
incarceration, or even, in extreme cases, more violent criminal punishment.58 Nor were settler communities homogeneous. Ethnic tensions,
particularly among the various Latin communities of French North
Africa, were by the 1920s intensifying amid the ideological frictions
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spilling over from southern Europe. Here, too, suspicion, stereotyping,
even sedition, infected European colonial minds.59
The accumulated experiences of the 1930s Depression, the upheavals
of defeat, regime changes, and “liberation” in World War II, and the proliferation of anticolonial violence as pressure for national independence
gathered momentum after 1945 inevitably swayed colonialist outlooks.
But neither local disorder nor extraneous factors proved sufﬁcient to
decolonize colonial minds to the extent that peaceful transitions from
empire to nation-state became possible in French Africa or Southeast
Asia.60 Rather, the violence of colonialism entered its last and bloodiest
phase. In a quantum leap from the protests and containable rebellions of
the pre-1939 period, wars of decolonization and unprecedented violence
gripped Indochina, Madagascar, and French North Africa. Cumulatively,
these conﬂicts spanned generations. Their immediate origins were evident in the disputed colonial heritage of World War II, in arguments over
precisely who or what would resume the levers of power throughout
the empire and with what longer-term objectives. Their ﬁnal acts were
part of the supposedly postcolonial international order of the 1960s.
In many cases, sites of colonial violence would morph into sites of internationalized conﬂict as Cold War pressures, regional rivalries, and
contested political successions provoked renewed struggles for power
in which the French found themselves largely observers.61
Violence, then, was as intrinsic to imperial decline as it was to imperial expansion. But was it merely the unprecedented breadth and scale
of decolonization’s violence that marked it out as different from its
prewar antecedents? Or are the patterns of collective violence in French
colonies after 1945 much the same as before? At the geopolitical level,
new elements might be sought in the intrusion of Cold War rivalry and
the growing part played by foreign proxies that arose from it.62 The consolidation of stronger organized nationalist groups and the fundamental
changes promised by Fourth Republic reformism each altered the terrain
on which contested colonial politics were fought. Deeper socioeconomic
changes also made empire something of a powder keg in the postwar
world. Industrial concentration and attendant labor disputes, urbanization and heightened demographic pressure, plus the reconﬁguration of
trade between the colonial world, France, and the capitalist West: all
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presented harder challenges to colonial authorities.63 Rapidly changing
cultural expectations in the colonies and in France about permissible
interventionism and permissible levels of violence — about what colonial administrations could or should be doing — added to the weight
on ofﬁcial minds.64 Also striking after 1945 were the growing regional
imbalances within French colonial violence, between what became war
zones — in Southeast Asia, Madagascar, and North Africa — and wide
swathes of territory, principally in West and Equatorial Africa and the
island territories, where organized political violence remained rare. The
settler presence, proximity to Cold War front lines, the amount of French
capital — human and commercial — at stake: each played a role in such
variation. But none is sufﬁcient to explain it outright. In those regions
where colonial impasse prevailed, oppositional violence and counterviolence gained intensity meanwhile. The result was to warp colonialist attitudes into grotesque self-parody. For some, most infamously in
the upper reaches of the colonial military, erstwhile imperial ideals of
sacriﬁce, public service, and cultural transmission became twisted into
a last-ditch defense of the colonial presence, seemingly at any price. Exploring diehard colonial minds in the age of decolonization resolves itself
into a disturbing exploration of how political circumstances, cultural
misreading, authoritarian impulses, and closed organizational cultures
give rise to extreme violence.65

Chapter Content: Volume 2
The ﬁrst of this volume’s two sections is focused on “cultures of violence
in the French Empire.” The Algerian colonial experience is writ large
here, as it is throughout the volume, and it is to France’s premier African
colony that we turn in William Gallois’s essay, the ﬁrst of the six essays
in this section. His is a careful reconsideration of changing depictions of
the French Army’s bloody work of Algerian conquest from the 1830s to
the 1850s. Creeping southward colonization, ﬁrst into the fertile lands
beyond the coast, then toward the Sahara’s northern reaches, was never
the “peaceful penetration” initially promised by its advocates. Punitive
raids or razzias, collective punishments, even the slaughter of entire
town populations and quiet toleration of slavery, all would mark out
the Algerian conquest for decades ahead.66 Gallois suggests that this
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process, through which mass violence entered the normative practice
of Algerian colonial rule, gave rise to multiple French “mental maps,”
each with distinctive perspectives on whether and how the conquest
should proceed. Far from being united and supportive, French political
opinion emerges as diffuse and dissentient in Gallois’s account. Thus, the
policy of settler colonization adopted in the late 1830s stirred powerful,
Enlightenment-inspired intellectual opposition, which drew on the antiimperialism of writers such as Montesquieu. Division was also apparent
between French liberals, who were quick to identify the colonial army
with the suppression of domestic liberal dissent, and a broader popular
culture, exempliﬁed by pamphlets, pictures, cartoons, and songs, which
venerated the Armée d’Afrique as a colonial reincarnation of Napoleon’s
grand armée.
Gallois then turns to consideration of this army, its leadership, and its
recourse to increasingly brutal forms of violence and collective punishment. Forever identiﬁed with General Thomas Bugeaud, the infamous
methods used to terrorize Algeria’s population hinged on the razzia — the
destructive raid in which civilians were terrorized, their property burned,
their livestock killed, and their crops seized or destroyed. Devised as a
form of deterrence, this strategy also deliberately blurred the line between civilian and combatant, the noncommittal and the insurgent.67
Sexual violence was also part of the repertoire of French terror, holding a mirror to the darkest reaches of colonial minds as military commanders essentialized the Algerian population as an undifferentiated
enemy against which violent acts of whatever sort were justiﬁed as, at
once, instrumental in hastening subjugation and outside the realms of
warfare between “civilized” cultures. The brutality of the conquest also
became inscribed on the minds of its perpetrators in other ways. Gallois
describes how ofﬁcers’ writings and reﬂections on their participation
in massacre returned time and again to metaphors of madness and of
a dystopian universe made real in Algeria. Thus, the leading colonial
minds of the Armée d’Afrique increasingly cast themselves as victims,
not instigators, of the violence and societal breakdown they described.
Metaphorical madness is meshed with actual evidence of mental disorder in Bertrand Taithe’s searing analysis of the Voulet-Chanoine Affair,
one of the ghastliest and bloodiest episodes of colonial conquest run
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riot in black Africa. The “affair” achieved notoriety in 1890s France,
not because of the horrendous levels of violence perpetrated against the
affected population of Upper Nigeria by a roving French military column, but because two of the junior ofﬁcers in charge of this expedition
murdered their French commanding ofﬁcer before wreaking still more
widespread havoc. Taithe shows that much may be learned about French
colonial minds from the three themes that dominated French popular
representation and political discussion of the Voulet-Chanoine Affair.
First, as mentioned above, a military expedition gone disastrously
wrong only became a political scandal because of the murder of one
ofﬁcer by two others who were apparently driven to insanity by their
personal encounters with colonialism. Linked to this, the second theme
was a propensity to employ psychological and psychiatric explanations
to explain the course of events. This Taithe identiﬁes as a tendency to
pathologize the French colonial mind, something that, as we have seen,
would recur until the closing events of decolonization. Behind this lay
a deeper assumption: namely, that the unfamiliarity of African colonial
environs had an inherent capacity to derange European minds.68 The
third theme was also perhaps the most telling. For all its savagery and
casual violence, the story of the Voulet-Chanoine column’s gory progress across the African interior still lies within the spectrum of colonial
conquest violence, albeit at the extreme end of that spectrum. In other
words, this descent into the heart of darkness was not all that exceptional, its Conradian horror notwithstanding. Only the murder of a
French ofﬁcer by others made it so. Taithe’s vivid and shocking account
of the Voulet-Chanoine expedition reminds us that colonial conquest
could be the very antithesis of the selﬂess heroism in the face of horriﬁc
local violence portrayed in the popular press of the day.
Routine violence, admittedly of less severity, also lies at the heart of
Michael Vann’s discussion of daily life in the settler districts of colonial
Hanoi. As Vann describes it, French settlement in Hanoi was born in
violence, nurtured in violence, and died in violence. Even where actual
assaults did not occur, the threat of native attacks was omnipresent in
Europeans’ lives.69 This is what Milton Osborne called the “background
anxiety” of settler existence.70 Vann concedes, however, that the paucity of available statistics impedes precise sociological analysis of the
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quality and quantity of European brutality, making any assessment of
the random and daily acts of violence impressionistic. The picture that
emerges is of corporal punishment as utterly routine, alongside racial
intolerance and arbitrary violence against a Vietnamese workforce. None
of this had much legal repercussion, at least for its perpetrators, but all
of it served to reafﬁrm colonial domination.71 Yet, as Vann makes clear,
in French colonial minds Hanoi was supposed to be different. The city
was often held up to contemporaries as a “model” colonial capital,
whose boulevards, beaux arts culture, and reﬁned European taste supposedly made it an island of tranquility amid a sea of rural hardship,
piracy, and feuding warlords. The demographic reality belies this image: Hanoi remained at least 90 percent indigène, and urban violence
within its supposedly tranquil conﬁnes was a daily occurrence. The city
also contained numerous sites of notorious violent acts whose symbolic
importance resonated — albeit in contrasting ways — in the minds of the
French, Vietnamese, and Chinese communities. The locations of a spate
of café bombings in 1913 or of the attempted poisoning of the city
garrison retained their poignancy for Europeans for years to come. So,
too, for the Vietnamese did the public execution grounds in which large
numbers of the country’s early nationalists met their end. The colonial
Hanoi that Vann describes was one in which French and Vietnamese
colonial minds would always remain completely at odds.
Joshua Cole’s expert treatment of the intercommunal violence that
erupted in the Algerian city of Constantine in August 1934 also links
issues of colonial mind-set with those of urban space. He suggests that
“colonial spaces” should be seen as, in some ways, “exceptional spaces”
in which violence played a central part.72 The point is proven by Cole’s
investigation of the ﬁndings of the Algerian government’s commission
of inquiry into Constantine’s 1934 riots. The commission took 126
depositions and reports in the four months to October 1934 in its attempt to attribute responsibility for the killing of twenty-four Jews and
four Muslims during the two days of disorder. Far from illuminating
the deeper causes of this intercommunal friction, the resultant ofﬁcial
report rehearsed a number of stereotypes and clichés regarding Jewish
and Muslim character traits and the role of Jews in the local economy, in
local politics, and in local culture. This inquest — a devastating example
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of an ofﬁcial colonial mind at work — articulated a vision of urban space
in which indigènes, Israélites, and settlers only emerged insofar as they
conformed to the bureaucratic characterization of a city demarcated
into separate quartiers, within which particular communities could be
expected to behave in certain ways. In this reading of events, the Jews
of Constantine were an essentially tribal community within the city and
thus, perversely, were responsible for their own persecution.
Cole’s argument goes further. He also reinterprets the anti-Semitic
violence of August 1934 and, in particular, the prominent role of local
Algerian Muslims within it, in light of the complex identity politics of
interwar Algeria in which categories of citizen and subject were more
highly politicized than ever. Much as local Jews strove to capitalize
on their status as citizens of the republic, Muslim community leaders
wrestled with the contradictions of constitutional and legal provisions
that enfranchised a narrow Muslim elite while still excluding the majority of their co-religionists. Cole’s conclusion tells us a good deal about
the sometimes dreadful consequences of how colonial minds worked.
His chapter illuminates the devastating consequences of the ways in
which the French authorities enshrined ethno-religious difference in
differential legal rights and limited access to the privileges of citizenship. Appreciating the resentments ﬁred by each of these discriminatory
practices is critical in understanding what, superﬁcially at least, has
usually been interpreted as an explosion of endemic intercommunal
violence — something emotive and visceral rather than highly politicized.
Far from it: Constantine’s deadly riots in August 1934 demonstrated that
colonial constructions of difference — in housing, in law, in citizenship
rights — complicated supposedly binary oppositions between European,
Jewish, and Muslim populations, making the frictions between them
less ethnically or religiously derived and more the product of Algeria’s
stumbling progress toward mass politics.
Samuel Kalman’s chapter retains the focus on interwar Algeria but
investigates a different community of colonial minds, those of the piedsnoirs settlers of the immediate prewar years, most notably in Oran, the
most settler-dominated city in the colony. In his reassessment of colon
support for the French ultrarightist movement, the Croix de Feu and its
post-1937 incarnation as the Parti Social Français (psf), Kalman uncovxxxi
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ers the speciﬁcally colonial factors that underpinned European support
for this quasi-fascistic group. His chapter dissects the public discourse
of local psf leaders, their violently anti-Semitic rhetoric in particular,
and contextualizes this language of violence by revisiting some of the
ultrarightists’ most notorious practices. In doing so his essay places the
exploitative nature of Algerian intercommunal relations, the de facto
segregation in the urban space of Algeria’s major cities, as well as rising
settler fears of Algerian integral nationalism at the heart of the Croix
de Feu/psf appeal.
As Kalman demonstrates both here and elsewhere, the language of
hatred and the political violence it posited were instrumental in extreme rightist action and integral to the collective identity of ultrarightist supporters, especially within the settler quartiers of Algeria’s major
towns. For all their odious invective the ultrarightists in France were
signiﬁcantly less violent than their counterparts in Algeria.73 For, as
Kalman argues, the gloriﬁcation of violence in the febrile atmosphere of
interwar Algeria was also symptomatic of something more, something
attributable to distinctly colonial minds. Echoes of the demographic
insecurity that nurtured the virulent racism apparent in Algeria’s settler culture during the interwar years were, for instance, to be found in
the continuing appeal of triumphalist Algerianist writings, typiﬁed by
the work of Robert Randau, as well as in the persistent use of crude
racial stereotypes in the settler press.74 Kalman picks up these cultural
undercurrents and concludes that an underlying anxiety pervaded the
minds of those settlers drawn to the ultraright. Despite the virulence of
their language and the violence of their activities, a sense of vulnerability
about the irresistible force of Algerian Muslim nationalism characterized their outlook. Put simply, behind the extreme right’s discourse of
colonial domination — racial and political — lay an abiding fear in the
settler mind, that of being swamped by the Muslim majority.
A different form of violence in Algeria, this time French-directed,
is central to my essay, the last in this ﬁrst section. It revisits the colossal state retribution meted out in the immediate aftermath of the May
1945 rebellion in the Constantine region of eastern Algeria.75 Ofﬁcial
blindness to the fatal weakness of the colonial state, part rhetoric, part
self-deception, is fundamental to an understanding of what followed the
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initial revolts in and around the towns of Sétif and Guelma. The colonial
authorities’ refusal to admit either the extent of Algerian loathing for
them or the possibility of their overthrow by revolution from below tells
us much about the “colonial minds” that directed the ofﬁcially sanctioned killings over the summer of 1945. The state violence occasioned
by the uprising represented far more than a simple restoration of colonial
order. Echoing William Gallois’s chapter on the early colonial period,
I argue that colonial rule created the socioeconomic circumstances in
which an essentialized view of undifferentiated indigènes, or Muslim
Algerians, as inferior, savage, and inherently prone to violence became
intrinsic to the actions of security forces and settler vigilantes.
As evidence accumulated of the savagery of the killings and sexual
violence in Sétif, Guelma, and, especially, the smaller settlement of Périgotville, so the tendency among an enraged settler community to ascribe
collective guilt, to impugn the entire Muslim population as inherently
vicious, increased.76 There are parallels here with the ways in which
European colonial populations in other empires chose to read other
episodes of collective violence, and, again, Ann Stoler’s work is particularly useful. In her analysis of Dutch responses to 1920s outbreaks of
worker unrest in Java’s plantation belt Stoler discerns a distinct interpretive pattern to colonial readings of dissent: “Here it is not violence per
se that justiﬁed armed police, intelligence networks, a penal code, and
physical force, but violence of a particular sort, stripped of its validity
and exposed as the response of irrational and rapacious elements. It
had to be shown as something outside rationality: as an unreasonable
response according to the canons of Western thought.”77 Security force
analyses of the Algerian situation depicted violent indigenous protest
in the same way. Intelligence assessment disconnected the practice of
violence by colonial subjects from socioeconomic conditions or political
grievances, denying its perpetrators any voice by insisting that the killing
of Europeans marked an atavistic return to the savagery inherent to Algerian identity.78 As James McDougall notes, this insistence on inherent
Algerian savagery was integral to French colonial thinking and made
recourse to violence against colonial subjects seem logically imperative.79
In its scale, its severity, and its target selection the French repression
let loose on eastern Algeria from May to August 1945 combined all that
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was worst about colonialism — intercommunal mistrust, socioeconomic
discrimination, cultural supremacy, and security force banality toward
acts of extreme violence perpetrated against a subject population.80 My
essay suggests that this consensus about the need for overwhelming
retributive violence ignored the tangible socioeconomic crisis that was
integral to the original outbreaks. By obscuring the very real material
hardships occasioned by food shortages and a breakdown in eastern Algeria’s foodstuff distribution networks in the latter stages of World War
II, the colonial authorities achieved two objectives. First, they absolved
themselves of blame for Algerian radicalization. Second, they negated
rational explanations for popular participation in attacks on European
settlers. As I contend, the Sétif uprising demonstrated the capacity of
political parties, religious groups, and Muslim cultural associations to
harness popular anger over long-standing economic hardship and cultural marginalization to nationalist political ends, something that the
colonial minds of French ofﬁcialdom in Algiers and Paris were reluctant to concede. Little wonder, then, that after Sétif there was no going
back, that colonial and nationalist minds were closed to the possibility
of compromise.
Volume 2’s second section, “Colonial Minds and Empire Soldiers,”
also comprises six chapters. Collectively, they focus squarely on questions of attitude, perception, and stereotyping in the characterization
and treatment of distinct strata of colonial society, including French
colonial troops, Muslim populations, and African women in mixedrace relationships. The prevalence of eugenicist ideas about what was
socially, racially, and sexually acceptable and what, in turn, was morally reprehensible is evident within several of the colonial minds analyzed here. So, too, was an awareness that while “acceptability” was
relative, its boundaries determined by local circumstance, colonists and
ofﬁcials nonetheless deﬁned their normative standards against certain
benchmarks of public behavior that required the preservation of French
dignity and prestige at all costs.81 Predominantly, these were men of
inﬂuence bound up in the codes of masculinity that Robert Nye has
identiﬁed as integral to the ethics of French professional elites during
the Belle Epoque and afterward.82 Nowhere more so than in the arena of
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interracial sex, a subject whose symbolic importance, whether in terms
of punitive regulation, boundaries transgressed, or bitter proof of masculine colonial power, makes it central to any consideration of colonial
minds.83 Contrary to what we — with twenty-ﬁrst-century minds — might
consider the worst sexual transgressions, “scandalous” behavior among
serving imperial ofﬁcials signiﬁed actions that undermined French colonial standing rather more than activities that might, in hindsight, be
considered cruel, criminal, or morally reprehensible.84 Owen White’s
chapter touches on all of this section’s central themes: colonial minds,
bodies, and power relationships. His chapter makes extensive use of
diaries and private letters to shed new light on four interracial relationships that took place in different parts of French West Africa during the
1890s and 1900s. The sensitivity of his account challenges us to rethink
ideas of colonial iniquity and sexual exploitation by confronting deceptively difﬁcult questions. Were loving relationships between French men
and African women either possible or sustainable in a colonial context?
Were such unions inherently exploitative? If we know something of the
answers in relation to African women, albeit inevitably too little, we
know less about the Frenchmen involved, whose intimate thoughts have
tended to become lost in sensationalist or recriminatory depictions of
interracial colonial sex.85
White’s examination is of the most personal aspect of the colonial
mind, perhaps the most impervious to dispassionate analysis. As he
suggests, it is easy to ﬁnd reference to such relationships, many of them
depicted in exoticized, Orientalist language. It remains much harder to
establish what such unions meant, especially to the two people involved.
At one extreme there were undoubtedly numerous cases of clear sexual
exploitation, often implicating those in high authority. To take but one
example, Governor-General of French West Africa François Clozel,
while on tour in northern Côte d’Ivoire, ordered daily “requisitions”
of African women for him and his retinue, something that disgusted
anthropologist Maurice Delafosse and others who witnessed it. Martin
Klein has also demonstrated that the French Sudan of the 1890s was
a colony run by and for the French Army, and a place where local
women were often treated as part of the spoils of conquest, as de facto
sex slaves.86 Here the violent and exploitative nature of interracial sex
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conformed closely to the stereotypical, two-dimensional characterization of white men using powerless black women. Moreover it is apparent that any interracial relationship typically involved the removal of
indigenous women or girls from their familiar spaces and local cultural
environments to European ones. These new locations and spaces became charged with colonial meaning as a consequence. Nonetheless,
in uncovering the more intimate reaches of the French colonial mind,
White’s essay points the way to a subtler, more multifaceted approach
to interracial relationships, and so to the most intimate dimensions of
colonial thinking, in the early years of French dominion in West Africa.
J. Kim Munholland’s essay revisits a well-known colonial military
career, that of Ernest Psichari. Often depicted in heroic terms, Psichari,
in the twenty years before he died on the Western Front, followed a distinct, but not unusual, political trajectory. It began with his upbringing
in a secular, republican, liberal family and ended in espousal of ardent
nationalism and high Catholicism. The path that connected these two
contrasting outlooks was his protracted colonial military service. Even
as a republican Dreyfusard, Psichari was ardently nationalist, but from
a colonial viewpoint he increasingly perceived metropolitan bourgeois
society as decadent and spiritually empty. Munholland shows that Psichari was increasingly driven by fear of the power of radical Islam to
overturn French imperial achievements. His vision grew more millenarian and racially exclusive as a result. Psichari’s remedy to what he
articulated as an impending “clash of civilizations” was a more vigorous,
Catholic-tinged pursuit of the civilizing mission. As Munholland makes
plain, the development of Psichari’s colonial mind suggests that we need
to rethink the categories of republican, nationalist, imperialist, Left, and
Right, rejecting any simplistic antagonism between them.
Joe Lunn’s consideration of colonial minds and African military bodies focuses upon the enormous numbers of young West African men
conscripted into the French Army to help ﬁght the Great War. At one
level the massive recourse to African military manpower was rooted in
fears of France’s worsening demographic disparity next to Germany.
At another level the placement of armed colonial units in the front line
was a logical next step for French military thinkers long accustomed,
like their British counterparts, to the exploitation of African labor for
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porterage and colonial campaigning.87 But as Lunn illustrates, only by
considering the assumptions of those army ofﬁcers in charge of the
process can one appreciate the form that this conscription eventually
took.88 As Richard Fogarty, another outstanding scholar of colonial
soldiery in World War I, points out, the enforced recruitment of empire
troops offers the starkest evidence of the contradictions inherent in a
“republican imperialism” that sought to reconcile universalist ideas with
the entrenched racial hierarchies of colonialism. By identifying whiteness
with authority, maturity, and competence, the French military necessarily
invested nonwhiteness with the opposite traits: indiscipline, immaturity,
and lesser intellectual capacity.89 The one quality supposedly left to the
empire’s “martial races” was their unquestioned capacity to ﬁght. It
was from this ﬁrst principle that the concept of a force noire arose.
The idea was initially propounded by a small coterie of career ofﬁcers
in the Sudanese units of the colonial army. They drew upon their own
observations of West Africa’s “warrior races” and their reading of the
hierarchies that they claimed to exist between them.90 Ardent proponents
of the prevailing martial race theories of the day, these ofﬁcers insisted
that West Africans would make redoubtable infantry and outstanding
assault troops.91 Crude racism also underpinned their arguments: certain Africans were allegedly attuned to particular military tasks because
they were accustomed to being beasts of burden, to endurance. Others
were supposedly equipped with “lesser” nervous systems, making them
more tolerant of pain and suffering. And according to General Charles
Mangin, the foremost architect of the force noire scheme, West African
soldiery had no conception of scientiﬁc progress, a contention repeatedly used to justify differential treatment of colonial troops in Europe.
Tracing the development of the force noire from initial conception to
ultimate deployment, Lunn demonstrates that for many of the 140,000
soldiers involved, the working of the French colonial military mind had
devastating consequences.
Where Joe Lunn’s essay indicts French military ofﬁcials for their attitudes and behavior prior to and during World War I, Martin Alexander’s
contribution does much the same by focusing on the fate of West African
troops in the Battle of France during May–June 1940. Alexander notes
the relative lack of interest, whether ofﬁcial, historical, or popular, in the
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actions of colonial troops during this brief but bloody campaign next to
their participation in the protracted trench warfare of 1914–18. With
the notable exceptions of historians Myron Echenberg, Nancy Lawler,
and, more recently, Raffael Scheck, African losses in the summer of
1940 remain little studied.92 Yet, as Gregory Mann has suggested, the
tirailleurs’ contribution to the defense of France in both world wars did
more than anything else to change the ways in which colonial obligation,
whether that of rulers to ruled, or of subjects to the mother country, was
articulated in twentieth-century France. Indeed, the discourse of colonial sacriﬁce and reciprocal duties still inﬂects contemporary thinking
about the rights of France’s African immigrant communities today.93 This
marks something of an advance on the racist caricatures so convincingly
exposed by William Cohen’s work on French attitudes to black Africans
before the twentieth century, and demonstrates once more the formative
inﬂuence of wartime experience on French attitudes, both public and
private.94 Martin Alexander’s essay builds on this, discerning a peculiarly
colonial mixture of ofﬁcer paternalism and abiding infantilization of
African soldiers, with clear echoes of the characterization of colonial
troops evident in World War I.95 Alexander examines the recruitment,
training, and eventual deployment of colonial army divisions in the
Battle of France, all factors immensely revealing of the persistent tropes
that marked out French military thinking about the utility and purpose
of colonial soldiers. Alexander shows how little military minds had
altered in the twenty years from 1919 to 1939. By focusing on particular units through a series of four detailed — and heart-rending — battle
case studies in which colonial infantry found themselves pitched into
the battle for France from ﬁrst encounters to ﬁnal surrender, Alexander
shows that senior military commanders remained in thrall to stereotypes
familiar from the earlier Franco-German conﬂict. Colonial units were,
once more, expected to play an assault role to which they were quite
unsuited in the face of markedly superior German equipment. In describing the inevitable, tragic outcome, Alexander brings us face to face
with the consequences of false assumptions in the French military mind.
The ﬁnal two essays in this volume investigate lesser-known elements
of the violence of Algeria’s decolonization. Their perspectives on colonial
minds are unusual. The historical and present-day focus on extreme acts
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of violence perpetrated on colonial or occupied populations perhaps obscures the more pervasive, indeed omnipresent experience of psychological terror and routine acts of lesser violence against civilian populations
that were a more or less daily occurrence. Such was certainly the case in
late colonial Algeria, the focal point of Neil MacMaster’s essay. His is a
study both of colonial and anticolonial minds as well as of the victims
of the uncompromising thinking among the strategists of the Algerian
War. MacMaster argues convincingly that the quotidian terror meted out
by both sides was just as central to colonial rule — and to revolutionary
movements’ efforts to overthrow it — as the more spectacular killings of
which more is now being written.96
The most salient — and damning — point here is that both sides, the
colonial state and its anticolonial opponents, were utterly intolerant of
attentisme, of civilians who sought, quite understandably, to straddle
the political fence. Neither side forgave the noncommittal, making it
impossible for civilians to shield themselves from the conﬂict by avoiding
taking sides.97 This intolerance developed into a full-blown strategy of
compliance terrorism.98 It was particularly effective as practiced through
the Front de Libération Nationale’s collection of prohibitions — bans on
smoking, drinking, fraternization, as well as its ruthless punishment of
any cooperation with the colonial state. Focusing on the ﬂn’s smoking
ban and efforts made by French military and civil authorities to countermand it, MacMaster provides a revealing point of entry into the social
reality of the Algerian War and the mind-sets of those who fought it.
His conclusion is clear: we should read the Algerian conﬂict as more of
a civil war than is widely assumed.
Mathilde von Bülow surveys another facet of the Algerian War in the
ﬁnal essay in this closing section. Her chapter examines a particular facet
of the internationalization of the conﬂict by discussing French police and
intelligence service monitoring of ﬂn activists and Algerian immigrant
workers in Paris, northeastern France, and West Germany from 1957 to
1962. In its account of arbitrary arrests, expulsions, detentions without
trial, and even summary killings, von Bülow’s essay describes the working of security service minds driven toward increasingly extreme acts
of violence. The catalyst here was the reorganization and relocation to
Cologne in West Germany of the ﬂn’s former covert network in mainxxxix
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land France.99 Using an array of recently declassiﬁed French and West
German state documents, the essay traces the blurring of distinctions
between terror and counterterror as the ﬁght against the ﬂn’s covert
apparatus in Western Europe became more desperate. It also reveals
how the violence perpetrated by the French security services escalated
beyond the control of politicians, civilian ofﬁcials, and diplomats. It is
a frightening insight into the workings of security service minds as they
struggled to counteract the growing successes of the ﬂn as a revolutionary organization committed to the overthrow of French colonial rule.
Robert Aldrich surveys the issues raised across the two volumes in a
reﬂective conclusion, a chapter in its own right, which discusses how we
might usefully understand concepts of a “colonial mind.” He examines
the long-term shifts in historical approaches to France’s troubling colonial past, reminding us in doing so that any academic analysis of colonial
minds must acknowledge factors liable to shape the interpretations of
those doing the analyzing. Aldrich therefore evaluates the development
of a French “national memory” of empire, relating this to changing
historical readings of French colonialism. He discusses the phenomenon
of “postcolonial forgetting” or the “occultation” of colonial misdoings.
Evidence of such forgetting extended beyond France to many of its former colonial territories where a number of single-party states, themselves
rooted in erstwhile anticolonial nationalist movements, have been proscriptive and highly selective in their representation of the colonial past.
Matters began to change in the 1980s as interest in problems of
collective memory grew dramatically, not least in French scholarship
where Annalist and structuralist, often Marxist, approaches to history
had, by then, lost their avant garde luster. Yet the colonies remained
strangely absent from this process, initially at least.100 As Aldrich suggests, something akin to a “thirty-year rule” seemed to apply to the
study of colonial memory. A certain inverse equation was also at work
here: space only opened up for the empire to command public attention as debates over Nazi occupation and Vichy collaboration slowed.
Media interest was stirred by the impending thirtieth anniversary of
Algerian independence in 1992, but extraneous events in former colonial
dependencies were perhaps more signiﬁcant. New Caledonia’s 1980s
évènements compelled recollection of the Algerian War. So, too, did
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Algeria’s tragic descent into bloody civil war after the annulment of the
Front Islamique du Salut (ﬁs) electoral triumph in 1991.101 The trial
of Maurice Papon and media reexamination of torture cases in Algeria
added momentum to the study of colonial memories and representations
of empire in France.102 It is this increasing memorialization, itself deeply
politicized, that leads Aldrich to pose the critical question: who is the
proper “guardian,” if any, of colonial memory?
It bears emphasis, of course, that the sum total of the essays in both
volumes might be dismissed as nothing more than the ruminations of
the scholastic postcolonial mind, as the thoughts and ideas of rareﬁed
academics — predominantly white, predominantly “Anglo-Saxon” (to
use the French phrase) — attuned to the specialist debates that hold sway
in the early twenty-ﬁrst century and writing in an international climate
in which accusations of a revival of Western colonialism, albeit in new
guises, are commonplace. This may be true. But the fact that perspectives
on empire and colonialism change over time is surely to be applauded.
If these essays contribute to that process, they have done their job.
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